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The pharmaceuticalisation of security:
Molecular biomedicine, antiviral stockpiles,
and global health security
STEFAN ELBE*
Abstract. Pharmaceuticals are now critical to the security of populations. Antivirals, antibiotics,
next-generation vaccines, and antitoxins are just some of the new ‘medical countermeasures’
that governments are stockpiling in order to defend their populations against the threat of
pandemics and bioterrorism. How has security policy come to be so deeply imbricated with
pharmaceutical logics and solutions? This article captures, maps, and analyses the ‘pharmaceu-
ticalisation’ of security. Through an in-depth analysis of the prominent antiviral medication
Tamiﬂu, it shows that this pharmaceutical turn in security policy is intimately bound up with
the rise of a molecular vision of life promulgated by the biomedical sciences. Caught in the
crosshairs of powerful commercial, political, and regulatory pressures, governments are em-
bracing a molecular biomedicine promising to secure populations pharmaceutically in the
twenty-ﬁrst century. If that is true, then the established disciplinary view of health as a pre-
dominantly secondary matter of ‘low’ international politics is mistaken. On the contrary, the
social forces of health and biomedicine are powerful enough to inﬂuence the core practices of
international politics – even those of security. For a discipline long accustomed to studying
macrolevel processes and systemic structures, it is in the end also our knowledge of the minute
morass of molecules that shapes international relations.
Stefan Elbe is Professor of International Relations and Director of the interdisciplinary Centre
for Global Health Policy at the University of Sussex. He has published widely on global health
security, including Security and Global Health: Towards the Medicalization of Insecurity (Polity
Press); Virus Alert: Security, Governmentality and the AIDS Pandemic (Columbia University
Press); and Strategic Implications of HIV/AIDS (Oxford University Press). He is also Chair of
the Global Health Section of the International Studies Association, and Co-Convener of the
Global Health Working Group of the British International Studies Association.
Introduction
The rapid rise of global health security as a new policy domain testiﬁes to the in-
creased attention that health issues are receiving in international politics. A seeming
epidemic of epidemic threats (from HIV/AIDS, SARS, H5N1, H1N1, through to
MERS, H7N9, and Ebola) has forced governments to grapple with the question of
how to best protect their populations and economies against acute infectious disease
threats.1 Deﬁned ofﬁcially by the World Health Organization (WHO), global health
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1 World Health Assembly (WHA). ‘Global health Security – Epidemic Alert and Response’, Report by
the Secretariat prepared for the Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly, A54/9 (Geneva: World Health
Assembly, 2001); Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), ‘Ministerial Statement’, London (March
2002), available at: {http://ghsi.ca/english/statementlondonmar2002.asp} accessed 8 April 2014; World
Health Organization (WHO), ‘A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century’, The
World Health Report (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2007); European Council, ‘Council Con-
clusions on Health Security’ (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 16 December 2008); European
security encompasses ‘the activities required, both proactive and reactive, to minimize
vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the collective health of
populations living across geographical regions and international boundaries’.2 Such
policies are necessary, according to WHO, because a new pandemic infecting roughly
25 per cent of the world population (a ﬁgure derived from previous pandemics),
would affect more than 1.5 billion people and cause enormous social disruption due
to a rapid surge in illnesses and deaths.3 The threat of bioterrorism – exempliﬁed
by the anthrax letters mailed in the United States in the autumn of 2001 – similarly
demands ongoing government efforts to prepare for the deliberate release of a bio-
logical agent. The twin spectres of naturally-occurring and intentionally-released
infectious disease threats have thus provoked a deep sense of microbial unease at
the outset of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Security agendas have evolved to reﬂect this mood shift, and now routinely incor-
porate health-based threats. In the United States, the 2002 National Security Strategy
made direct reference to infectious diseases, pledging that the US government will
‘continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS and
other infectious diseases’.4 The 2006 US National Security Strategy again pointed to
the threat posed by ‘public health challenges like pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian inﬂu-
enza) that recognise no borders’.5 When the United Kingdom developed its ﬁrst ofﬁ-
cial national security strategy in 2008, it too began to highlight pandemic threats –
both because of their ability to affect the country, and because they could potentially
undermine international stability.6 Pandemic threats also continue to reside at the
apex of the UK’s national risk register, and are identiﬁed as a Tier 1 (top) threat in
the latest National Security Strategy.7 Those UK efforts, in turn, unfolded against
the backdrop of wider European Union initiatives to also develop a European health
security strategy.8 In a way that would have been unimaginable only a decade ago,
potentially catastrophic infectious disease threats have become the unlikely bedfellows
of more established security threats like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, rogue states,
and so forth.9
The emergence of those global health security concerns creates new challenges
and opportunities for International Relations scholarship. First, global health security
marks another signiﬁcant expansion of the international security agenda. At a time
Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document on Health Security in the European Union and
Internationally’ (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 23 November 2009); Stefan
Elbe, Virus Alert: Security, Governmentality and the AIDS Pandemic (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009); Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Towards the Medicalization of Insecurity (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2010).
2 WHO, ‘A Safer Future’, p. ix.
3 Ibid., p. 47.
4 White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (Washington, DC:
September 2002), p. vi.
5 White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (Washington, DC:
March 2006), p. 47.
6 Cabinet Ofﬁce, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent
World’ (London: The Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2008), p. 3.
7 Cabinet Ofﬁce, ‘A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’ (London:
The Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2010), p. 27.
8 Irish Presidency of the European Union, ‘Presidency Conﬁrms Agreement on Strengthening Responses
to Serious Cross-Border Health Threats’, available at: {http://www.eu2013.ie/news/news-items/
20130516crossborderhealthupdateengonly/} accessed 28 May 2013.
9 Adam Kamradt-Scott and Colin McInnes, ‘The securitisation of pandemic inﬂuenza: Framing, security
and public policy’, Global Public Health, 7: Supp 2: S95–S110 (2012); see also Elbe, Virus Alert; and
Elbe, Security and Global Health.
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when a number of infectious diseases have become the subject of high-level, sustained
and even acrimonious international diplomacy, scholars of International Relations
are challenged to rectify their neglect of the international politics of health. Second,
global health security also opens up new opportunities for investigating the intricate
dynamics of securitisation in world politics.10 Amidst the pantheon of recent securiti-
sation processes, global health security stands out because it begins to transform the
inner biological workings of our bodies into additional sites of security concern.11
Here the rise of global health security is engendering a range of new practices that
can be fruitfully explored with a view to deepening our understanding of contem-
porary securitisation processes. For those two reasons alone, a burgeoning Inter-
national Relations literature has already turned its analytical sites on global health
security.12
Yet there is also a third – and altogether different – reason why the rise of global
health security marks such a signiﬁcant development in world politics. All the high-
level concern around global health security dramatically elevates the role that phar-
maceuticals now play in security policy. Acknowledging the dangers of health-based
threats has gone hand-in-hand with a heighted government interest in developing
new pharmaceutical defences against those very threats. The more governments
worry about the threat posed by infectious diseases, the more they come to realise
that the security of their populations necessitates things other than organised armed
forces; it also requires the ability to implement a range of public health interventions
(like travel restrictions and social distancing measures), and ultimately the procure-
ment of large quantities of new pharmaceutical and medical products that can be
quickly dispensed to the population in the event that a biological threat should
materialise. Strengthening health security over the past decade has thus entailed
extensive government investment in the development, acquisition, stockpiling, and
distribution of new ‘medical countermeasures’ – like antivirals, antibiotics, next-
generation vaccines, and antitoxins.
This article captures, maps, and analyses that pharmaceutical turn in security
policy. It argues that the ‘pharmaceuticalisation’ of security is intimately bound up
with the rise of a molecular vision of life promulgated by the biomedical sciences.
As the article shows through the ﬁrst in-depth case study of the prominent antiviral
medication Tamiﬂu, that molecular knowledge forms the scientiﬁc basis for the phar-
macological development of many new medical countermeasures. Once created, the
commercial backers of such innovative molecular therapies then seek to maximise
their ﬁnancial return on investment by trying to persuade governments to procure
large quantities of their new products. At the same time, citizens themselves also in-
creasingly expect their governments to facilitate rapid access to the latest pharmaceu-
tical treatments – especially during a national emergency. Caught in the crosshairs of
those combined commercial and political pressures, governments are adapting their
regulatory regimes to make innovative medical countermeasures more readily and
widely accessible.
10 Stefan Elbe, ‘Should HIV/AIDS be securitized?’, International Studies Quarterly, 50:1 (2006), pp. 119–
44; Sara Davies, ‘Securitizing infectious disease’, International Affairs, 84:2 (2008), pp. 295–313; Colin
McInnes and Simon Rushton, ‘HIV/AIDS and securitization theory’, European Journal of International
Relations, 19:1 (2013), pp. 115–38.
11 Elbe, Security and Global Health.
12 Simon Rushton and Simon and Jeremy Youde (eds), Routledge Handbook of Global Health Security
(Oxford: Routledge, 2014); see also Joao Nunes, ‘Questioning health security: Insecurity and domina-
tion in world politics’, this Special Issue.
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All of this implies that the conventional disciplinary view of health as a predom-
inantly secondary matter of ‘low’ international politics is incorrect. On the contrary,
this article points to social forces of health and biomedicine that are sufﬁciently power-
ful to shape the core practices of international politics – even those of security. Look-
ing more closely at the role of pharmaceuticals in security policy reveals that, far from
being tangential to international studies, health and medicine in fact play a constitutive
role in our understandings, analyses, and practices of international relations.13
I. Medical countermeasures: Securing populations pharmaceutically
If there is one concept that succinctly captures the pharmaceutical turn in security
policy it is this: ‘medical countermeasures’. The exact deﬁnition of the term, which
has recently gained extensive policy traction, is far from settled. One attempt to
deﬁne it emanates from the inﬂuential Institute of Medicine (IOM) in the United
States: ‘a drug, biological product, or device that treats, identiﬁes, or prevents harm
from a biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent that may cause a public
health emergency’.14 Technicalities of the deﬁnition aside, the concept of medical
countermeasures broadly refers to pharmaceutical interventions that can be mass ad-
ministered to populations in the event of a deliberate or naturally occurring security
threat materialising.
It is a treasure trove of a concept in that it manages – in a single idea – to com-
bine at least three fascinating and intertwined developments. On the one hand, the
term expresses the keen interest that governments currently display in developing
novel pharmaceutical defences against security threats. On the other hand, the term
also textually embodies the progressive epistemic blending of the professional worlds
of medicine (‘medical’) and security/defence (‘countermeasures’) – neatly merging
key vocabularies from both expert communities. Finally, the term reﬂects the harden-
ing aspiration of governments to extend such pharmaceutical protections beyond the
battleﬁeld, and to cover much larger civilian populations. Consider, for example, the
Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE) in the
United States. Citing the need to defend American citizens against health security
threats, it takes the lead in ‘protecting the civilian population from potential adverse
health impacts through the use of medical countermeasures, which are medicines,
devices, or other medical interventions that can lessen the harmful effects of these
threats’.15 In a single notion, the concept of medical countermeasures captures how
security policy has recently gravitated much more strongly towards pharmaceutical
solutions, how the concerns of health and security professionals increasingly inter-
penetrate each other, and how security planners are broadening out those pharma-
ceutical protections beyond the military to cover entire populations. It is, in that
regard, the quintessential concept of health security.
13 See also Alison Howell, ‘The global politics of medicine: Beyond global health, against securitization
theory’, this Special Issue.
14 Institute of Medicine (IOM), ‘Medical Countermeasure Dispensing: Emergency Use Authorization and
the Postal Model’, Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010), p. 5.
15 US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), ‘2012 HHS PHEMCE Strategy and Implemen-
tation Plan’ (Washington, DC, 2012), available at: {http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/
Pages/strategy.aspx} accessed 13 March 2013.
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All of that is no doubt making a lot of demands of a singular concept. Moreover,
it is comparatively easy to coin new terms. So, to what extent has the new concept of
medical countermeasures also been backed by more meaningful ﬁnancial commit-
ments? In fact, some governments have already made quite substantial investments
in the development of new medical countermeasures. The United States, for example,
has expended signiﬁcant public funds through the BioShield program launched in
2004. The programme sought to accelerate the research, development, purchase,
and availability of effective medical countermeasures by establishing a secure source
of public funding worth US $5.6 billion. The idea behind that legislation was for the
US government to make a credible budgetary commitment to bulk-buy new medical
countermeasures, and that this would serve as a ﬁnancial incentive to lure phar-
maceutical companies into the medical countermeasures market.16 It is one of the
strongest pieces of evidence that governments are doing more than just paying lip
service to the quest for novel pharmaceutical defences.
Perhaps, then, all of this political activity around medical countermeasures is
simply a knee-jerk political reaction to the extraordinary events of 11 September
2001, and the subsequent mailing of the anthrax letters in the United States? Not
so. For the US government has also demonstrated its longer-term commitment to
this area through the creation of a whole new institution tasked with realising the
new medical countermeasures mission – the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority (BARDA) established in 2006. The organisation’s primary
strategic goal is to create an ‘advanced development pipeline replete with medical
countermeasures and platforms to address unmet public health needs, emphasizing
innovation, ﬂexibility, multi-purpose and broad spectrum application, and long-
term sustainability’.17 Further goals of the organisation include the maintenance
of an ‘agile, robust and sustainable U.S. manufacturing infrastructure capable of
rapidly producing vaccines and other biologics against pandemic inﬂuenza and other
emerging threats’.18 Over a decade after the pivotal events of 2001, the US govern-
ment’s political commitment to the medical countermeasure enterprise continues,
as evidenced by its recent decision to reauthorise BARDA for another ﬁve years
through passing the Pandemic All Hazards Preparedness Reauthorisation Act of
2013.
Since its inception, BARDA has initiated and/or completed acquisition contracts
for new medical countermeasures worth more than US $2 billion – on anthrax anti-
toxins and vaccines, botulism therapeutics, smallpox vaccine, and radiological,
nuclear, and chemical threats.19 The extent to which Project Bioshield has been suc-
cessful remains a topic of considerable debate. However, the US government has
already been able to add 11 new products to the nation’s emergency stockpile under
the programme; and – according to the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response, Nicole Lurie – there are a further eighty pharmaceuticals in various stages
16 IOM, ‘Medical Countermeasure Dispensing’, p. 6.
17 Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), ‘BARDA Strategic Plan:
2011–2016’ (Washington, DC, 2011), p. 1, available at: {http://www.phe.gov/about/barda/Pages/
2011barda-stratplan.aspx} accessed 8 April 2014.
18 Ibid.
19 US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), ‘Project BioShield Annual Report to Congress
January 2011 – December 2011’ (Washington, DC: Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness
and Response, 2012).
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of development.20 Those contracts have led to federal acquisitions totalling tens of
millions of doses of medical countermeasures.21 The acquisitions come, furthermore,
against the background of a wider US government investment of around US $79
billion in civilian biodefense research made since 2001, and in addition to any classi-
ﬁed research conducted in the security and defence agencies.22
Evidence abound, then, that pharmaceuticals have become much more pivotal to
security policy. A new conceptual vocabulary has been forged in the form of ‘medical
countermeasures’ – allowing pharmaceutical responses to be closely integrated into
security policy. Substantial public treasure has been earmarked and allocated for
the commercial development of new pharmaceutical defences. And entire new insti-
tutions have been created with the explicit mission of working more closely with
pharmaceutical companies to develop and procure innovative medical counter-
measures. At the outset of the twenty-ﬁrst century, security policy is becoming more
deeply infused with pharmaceutical logics and rationalities.
II. Pharmaceutical stockpiling: The logistics of global health security
The pharmaceutical turn in security policy entails more than just the scientiﬁc develop-
ment of novel medical countermeasures. Securing populations pharmaceutically also
demands that governments are able to deliver the right drugs, to the right people,
at the right time. Here public ofﬁcials have had to undertake further and extensive
logistical planning, culminating in the instigation of another novel security practice:
pharmaceutical stockpiling. There is, to be sure, nothing new about stockpiling per
se; in fact, historians can trace the practice back for thousands of years. Even during
the latter half of the twentieth century, many strategic supplies – including hospital
and medical supplies – were stockpiled in the context of the Cold War.
Efforts to strengthen health security, however, have given rise a new type of
stockpile – one dedicated predominantly, and even exclusively, to pharmaceuticals.
In 1999, and against the background of growing concerns about bioterrorism and
natural disasters, the United States Congress tasked the Clinton administration with
creating a new National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) that would supply states
and communities with large quantities of essential medical material within 12 hours
of a government decision.23 The new stockpile was limited in size, originally sup-
ported with a comparatively modest allocation of US $51 million. Even more signiﬁ-
cant than its initial size, however, is the fact that this new stockpile was now dedicated
speciﬁcally to pharmaceuticals.
In any case, the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax letters
would soon alter the picture dramatically. In 2003, the stockpile was renamed the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), as it rapidly evolved into a much wider ‘national
20 Chris Schneidmiller, ‘Q&A: bioshield program successful after ‘‘Rocky Start’’, HHS Preparedness Chief
says’, Global Security Newswire (1 March 2013), available at: {http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/q-
bioshield-program-successful-after-rocky-start-hhs-preparedness-chief-says/} accessed 28 June 2013.
21 HHS, ‘Project BioShield Annual Report’.
22 Tara Kirk Sell and Matthew Watson, ‘Federal agency biodefense funding, FY2013–FY2014’, Bio-
security and Bioterrorism, 11:3 (September 2013), pp. 196–216.
23 Stephen Prior, ‘Who You Gonna Call? Responding to a Medical Emergency with the Strategic National
Stockpile’, Report Commissioned by the National Defense University, Center for Technology and
National Security Policy (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, June 2004).
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repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV
administration and airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items’.24
Those stockpiled medical countermeasures are now stored in a large number of pre-
packed ‘push’ pallets, so that they can be delivered anywhere in the United States at
short notice. By 2006, such SNS packages reportedly ﬁlled 124 cargo containers,
weighing 94,424 pounds and taking up 5,000 square feet of ﬂoor space.25 Two years
later, by 2008, the total inventory of the stockpile was valued at US $3.5 billion.26
The precise geographic location and detailed composition of this stockpile re-
mains classiﬁed in order to prevent a run on the supplies during an emergency. How-
ever, the US government has disclosed that the stockpile was ﬁrst deployed on 11
September 2001. Of the four airplanes reportedly cleared to ﬂy in American airspace
that night, one was Air Force One – with the remaining three supporting the SNS
deployment.27 The decision to create, and deploy, such dedicated pharmaceutical
stockpiles shows that governments are doing more than simply investing in the de-
velopment of novel medical countermeasures; they are also adapting their security
practices to deliver those pharmaceuticals to the population much more rapidly dur-
ing an emergency.
Perhaps, then, this move towards pharmaceutical stockpiling in security policy is
just a peculiarly American phenomenon? The United States, after all, is home to the
world’s largest pharmaceutical market. It is also one of the few countries in the world
where pharmaceuticals can be directly advertised to consumers. And it is a country
where the pharmaceutical lobby yields substantial political inﬂuence.
There is no doubt that the United States has been at the international forefront of
pharmaceutical stockpiling for security purposes; but it would be erroneous to simply
dismiss the rise of pharmaceutical stockpiling as a US phenomenon. In fact, the prac-
tice of pharmaceutical stockpiling has also been adopted by many other countries
around the world. More recently, the European Union established a new legal basis
for the voluntary joint procurement of medical countermeasures by member states,
especially for inﬂuenza vaccines.28 The Australian government also created a National
Medical Stockpile (NMS) with a strategic reserve of essential vaccines, antibiotics,
antiviral drugs, as well as chemical and radiological antidotes.29 The Canadian govern-
ment similarly maintains a National Emergency Stockpile System,30 whilst the United
Kingdom too has assembled a Reserve National Stock for Major Incidents including
nerve agent antidotes, antitoxins, antibiotics, and other post-exposure medications –
albeit on a smaller scale than in the United States.31
In other areas of global health security, furthermore, the United Kingdom’s phar-
maceutical stockpiling efforts trump even those of the United States government. As
24 IOM, ‘Medical Countermeasure Dispensing’, p. 6.
25 Stephen Prior, ‘Who You Gonna Call?’, p. 7.
26 Todd Piester, ‘Strategic National Stockpile: Pandemic Inﬂuenza Countermeasures’, Presentation: Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, GA: 21 August 2008).
27 Stephen Prior, ‘Who You Gonna Call?’, p. 2.
28 Irish Presidency of the EU, ‘Presidency Conﬁrms Agreement on Strengthening Responses’.
29 Department of Health, ‘National Medical Stockpile’, Australian Government Department of Health,
available at: {http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/health-pubhlth-strateg-
bio-factsht_stckpile.htm} accessed 5 March 2014.
30 Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), ‘National Emergency Stockpile System’ (2012), available at:
{http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ep-mu/ness-eng.php} accessed 5 March 2014.
31 UK Department of Health, ‘Emergency Planning: UK Reserve National Stock for Major Incidents’
(London: United Kingdom Department of Health, 2007).
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part of its pandemic preparedness planning, UK authorities created one of the
world’s largest stockpiles of antiviral medications in 2005. Amidst fears that H5N1
(‘bird’) ﬂu could mutate into a form that would cause a devastating human pan-
demic, the UK government identiﬁed the antiviral medication oseltamivir (brand
name: Tamiﬂu) as the ‘ﬁrst line of defence’. The UK subsequently expended con-
siderable public resources to create a new national stockpile of the drug sufﬁciently
large to cover half of its population. Later, the UK government increased the size of
this antiviral stockpile further still, this time to cover 80 per cent of the population – a
far higher percentage than the equivalent US ambition to achieve 25 per cent coverage
of its population.
Many other governments in Europe and around the world have been building
similar antiviral stockpiles. A review of European pandemic plans published in
2006, found that twenty European countries had already developed an antiviral-
drug strategy – a trend that would intensify through 2007.32 In a context where, by
2009, a total of 95 governments around the world had reportedly purchased or
ordered antiviral stockpiles, pharmaceutical stockpiling cannot be dismissed as a
peculiarly US phenomenon.33
Even with the creation of all these new pharmaceutical stockpiles, however, a
crucial gap in coverage remained. What if a new infectious disease broke out in a
low-income country without a stockpile? Would those countries simply be aban-
doned to endure their tragic and likely horrible epidemiological fate? Amidst fears
in 2005 of an imminent H5N1 (‘bird ﬂu’) pandemic, the commercial manufacturer
and distributor of Tamiﬂu – Roche – reportedly shared its order book with the
head of Inﬂuenza Unit at the World Health Organization. Alarmingly, the book re-
vealed that countries from Southeast Asia had placed only very few antiviral orders,
even though this was the place that many experts predicted to be the geographical
source of a new pandemic. Everyone understood the implications: if an outbreak
occurred there, many of those countries would not have access to antivirals.34 That
realisation not only exposed worrying international inequalities between high- and
low-income countries regarding access to medical countermeasures; it also directly
threatened the interests of high income countries – especially if the virus were to
quickly spread to their populations on the back of an increasingly globalised air
transport infrastructure.
Interest therefore quickly turned towards setting up a supplementary international
antiviral stockpile for rapid deployment to anywhere in the world, and with the hope
of stopping a new inﬂuenza virus at source. An inﬂuential modelling study published
in the scientiﬁc journal Nature in September 2005 showed that such an international
stockpile approach could be viable. The paper concluded: ‘elimination of a nascent
pandemic may be feasible using a combination of geographically targeted prophy-
laxis and social distancing measures’, and predicted that ‘a stockpile of 3 million
courses of antiviral drugs should be sufﬁcient for elimination’.35 By that time WHO,
32 Sandra Mounier-Jack and Richard Coker, ‘How prepared is Europe for pandemic inﬂuenza? Analysis
of national plans’, The Lancet, 367 (2006), p. 1408.
33 Roche Pharmaceuticals, ‘Preparing for and Responding to Inﬂuenza Pandemics: Roles and Responsi-
bilities of Roche’ (June 2012), available at: {www.roche.com/roles_responsibilities_inﬂuenza.pdf} ac-
cessed 25 February 2013.
34 Ramina Samii and Luk van Wassenhove, Fighting the Flu: Tamiﬂu Stockpiling: A Pandemic Preparedness
Policy (Fontainebleau: Insead, 2008), p. 5.
35 Neil Ferguson, D. Cummings, S. Cauchemez, C. Fraser, S. Riley, A. Meeyai, S. Iamsirithaworn, and
D. Burke, ‘Strategies for containing an emerging inﬂuenza pandemic in Southeast Asia’, Nature,
437:7056 (2005), p. 209.
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which has played a key role in the rise of pharmaceutical stockpiling, was already
in the process of negotiating the donation of three million treatment courses from
Roche for the creation of a new international stockpile. In January 2006, this inter-
national stockpile was increased by a further two million donated courses earmarked
for developing countries.36 The stockpile was physically co-located in the United
States and Switzerland – from where it could be quickly ﬂown to a major airport
anywhere in the world.37
It was a risky strategy. Could a pandemic really be stopped in its tracks? What if
some of the assumptions in the theoretical modelling were mistaken, or if the virus
did not behave according to those assumptions? Moreover, the size of the stockpile
was clearly still very modest, especially when compared to the billions of people
living in low-income countries. Again, however, what is more signiﬁcant than the
overall size of the stockpile, is the fact that this new international stockpile now ex-
tended the geographic ‘blanket’ of antiviral protection to also cover those countries
unable to afford their own pharmaceutical supplies. With the creation of the inter-
national WHO stockpile, pharmaceutical stockpiling effectively became a global
phenomenon.
And still a crucial gap in global health security remained. As public health planners
were quick to point out, the mere procurement of new pharmaceutical stockpiles
alone would not guarantee security in the event of an outbreak. In fact, those stock-
piles would be fairly useless if they were not accompanied by efﬁcient mechanisms for
rapidly distributing those medicines to large numbers of people. Relevant govern-
ment departments would therefore also need to urgently develop new systems of
mass pharmaceutical administration. One of the most innovative and prominent ex-
amples of such a new logistical system was the launch of the National Pandemic Flu
Service (NPFS) in the United Kingdom during the 2009 inﬂuenza A (H1N1) ‘swine
ﬂu’ pandemic. Faced with an unexpected surge in human H1N1 infections, which
was by that time also beginning to place a heavy burden on the National Health
Service (NHS), the authorities in England decided to launch a new telephone and
internet-based pharmaceutical distribution system that could deliver the antiviral
medications directly to members of the population. It was, in the words of one
report, the ‘ﬁrst mass application of non-clinical based triage’.38
Once the new pharmaceutical distribution system went live, and after sorting out
some of the initial teething issues caused by overwhelming volumes of Internet trafﬁc,
obtaining Tamiﬂu became quite straightforward for citizens. It was simply a matter
of picking up the phone or going online, connecting to the new website, and ticking a
few boxes related to a set of common ﬂu symptoms. If the symptoms criteria were
met, citizens were asked to note down a unique reference number to obtain Tamiﬂu
from the nearest ofﬁcial collection point – preferably through the use of what British
authorities affectionately referred to as their ‘ﬂu buddies’. Not surprisingly, the system
was easily open to abuse from those who wanted to create personal stockpiles of the
drug. As one manager of a general medical practice noted with exasperation at the
36 Samii and Wassenhove, Fighting the Flu, p. 5.
37 Ibid.
38 Maureen Baker, ‘Quality Assuring the NPFS . . . and Further RCGP Reﬂections on Pandemic H1N1
(2009)’, A Report on the NPFS and the H1N1 Swine Flu Outbreak for the Chief Medical Ofﬁcer
(Personal Correspondence, 2010), p. 7.
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time: ‘at present, it might as well be given out on street corners’.39 Overall the service
reportedly performed 2,732,000 assessments, of which around 1,800,000 resulted in
antiviral authorisation.40
Although the British antiviral distribution system was one of the world’s most
wide-ranging and ambitious, all countries investing in pharmaceutical stockpiles
needed to develop plans for rolling out medical countermeasures to their popula-
tions. Different models considered and/or adopted by governments included the use
of national postal systems, relying on commercial logistics companies, on school
buses, or even asking the military to undertake that task. In the end, it is really not
so signiﬁcant which model governments selected. The very fact that they engaged in
such extensive logistical planning – on top of their attempts to actively stimulate the
development of new medical countermeasures – indicates just how pivotal pharma-
ceuticals have become to security policy. What is arguably a country’s highest political
priority – ensuring national security – is now closely dependent upon a government’s
ability not just to actively develop and acquire, but also to stockpile and rapidly dis-
seminate, large volumes of medical countermeasures.
All those developments render global health security more than just another episode
of ‘securitisation’ in contemporary world politics. The rise of global health security is
also signiﬁcant because it marks a critical expansion and intensiﬁcation of the play
of pharmaceutical logics in society. Here, in other words, the rise of global health
security begins to emerge as part of a much wider social trend towards increased
pharmaceuticalisation that can also be witnessed in many other sectors of society. A
number of social scientists working in different disciplines (especially Sociology and
Anthropology) are already detecting a very similarly proliferation of pharmaceutical
rationalities across quite a diverse array of societal domains and locals.41 Building
upon that rapidly evolving social science literature, we can think of the process
through which security policy too is becoming more deeply imbued with pharmaceu-
tical reason as the ‘pharmaceuticalisation’ of security.
III. Molecular life: Tamiﬂu, antivirals, and biomedicine
This pharmaceutical turn in security policy described above is intimately bound up
with the ascendancy of a molecular vision of life promulgated by the biomedical
sciences. The sociologist Nikolas Rose argues that the new molecular vision of exis-
tence can be usefully contrasted with an older ‘molar’ model of life and medicine
revolving around the visible human body – with its limbs, organs, tissues, blood,
and so forth. That older ‘clinical gaze’, famously described by Michel Foucault in
The Birth of Clinic, is now being supplemented and perhaps even supplanted by
a new molecular biomedicine that understands life as a ‘set of intelligible vital
39 Sandra Peek, ‘The distribution of Tamiﬂu is open to widespread abuse’, letter to The Telegraph (29
July 2009), available at: {http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/5926603/The-distribution-of-
Tamiﬂu-is-open-to-widespread-abuse.html} accessed 8 July 2010.
40 Maureen Baker, ‘Quality Assuring the NPFS’.
41 Andrew Lakoff, Pharmaceutical Reason: Knowledge and Value in Global Psychiatry (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005); John Abraham, ‘Pharmaceuticalization of society in context: Theoretical,
empirical and health dimensions’, Sociology, 44:4 (2010), pp. 603–22; S. Williams, P. Martin, and J.
Gabe, ‘The pharmaceuticalisation of society? An analytical framework’, Sociology of Health and Illness,
33:5 (2011), pp. 710–25.
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mechanisms among molecular entities that can be identiﬁed, isolated, manipulated,
mobilized, recombined, in new practices of intervention, which are no longer con-
strained by the apparent normativity of a natural vital order’.42 This molecular
vision of life is closely – and in fact doubly – implicated in the pharmaceuticalisation
of security.
First, the reimagination of life as constituted by the complex interplay of molecular
structures and processes is stimulating an array of profound new anxieties about the
microbiological vulnerabilities underlying our existence. That is certainly true in the
case of bioterrorism, where the growing ability to purposefully manipulate life at
the molecular level gives rise to new fears about how microorganisms could be delib-
erately reengineered or synthesised to cause immense harm to populations.43 Simi-
larly, our detailed scientiﬁc knowledge of the molecular processes unfolding in nature
makes us realise that viruses and bacteria are continuously mutating with the poten-
tial to give rise to threatening new pandemics in future. As Angus Nicoll, head of the
inﬂuenza programme at the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC) puts it: ‘policy-makers and politicians are put in a hard place by the pros-
pect of modern inﬂuenza pandemics. They don’t know when one is going to happen,
where it will start or what it will be like. The only certainty is that future inﬂuenza
pandemics will occur and they will be unpredictable.’44 Here, the molecular vision
of life is triggering new microbial anxieties.
Yet if the molecular vision of life is inducing an array of new biological insecuri-
ties, it is similarly engendering the development of many new molecular technologies
for protecting us from those very threats. How we understand life, in other words, is
also reﬂected in the strategies we develop to intervene upon it medically. Nothing,
perhaps, exempliﬁes this better than the antiviral medication Tamiﬂu. We have
already seen that governments around the world invested heavily in stockpiling
Tamiﬂu for both the treatment and prevention of pandemic inﬂuenza. That quickly
turned Tamiﬂu it into one of – if not the – most prominent medical countermeasure
of the past decade. Roche reports that it supplied around 350 million treatment
courses (3.5 billion doses) of Tamiﬂu to governments worldwide between 2004 and
2009 alone,45 and that more than 50 million people have taken Tamiﬂu around the
world.46
So what exactly is Tamiﬂu? As an antiviral medication, Tamiﬂu works quite
differently from a traditional vaccine. It is comprised of an artiﬁcially synthesised
molecule that has been deliberately designed to interfere with the processes of viral
replication unfolding inside the human body. The pharmaceutical development of
Tamiﬂu occurred against the backdrop of great twentieth-century strides achieved in
42 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First
Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 5–6; see also Lily E. Kay, The Molecular
Vision of Life: Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993); Lily E. Kay, Who Wrote the Book of Life?: A History of the Genetic Code
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, ‘Global liberal gover-
nance: Biopolitics, security and war’, Millennium, 30:1 (2001), pp. 41–66.
43 Bruce Braun, ‘Biopolitics and the molecularization of life’, Cultural Geographies, 14:1 (2007), pp. 6–28.
44 Angus Nicoll and Marc Sprenger, ‘Learning lessons from the 2009 pandemic: Putting infections in their
proper place’, European Journal of Epidemiology, 26:3 (2011), pp. 191–4, 191.
45 David Reddy, ‘Responding to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂuenza: The role of oseltamivir’, Journal of
Antimicrobial Chemotheray, 65: Suppl 2:ii (2007), pp. 35–40.
46 Roche, ‘Media Release’ (26 April 2007), available at: {http://www.roche.com/media/media_releases/
med-cor-2007-04-26.htm} accessed 3 September 2013, p. 12.
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our scientiﬁc understanding of the molecular processes surrounding inﬂuenza virus
replication – especially following successful isolation of the ﬁrst human inﬂuenza
virus in 1933. Scientists now know that viruses, including inﬂuenza viruses, cannot
replicate on their own; to do that they need to insert themselves into existing cells,
and then use the cell to make more copies of themselves. The new virus particles sub-
sequently leave the cell again, destroying the host cell in the process, before going on
to infect further cells – repeating this cycle again and again.
Yet the accumulated knowledge about those intricate molecular processes in-
volved in viral replication also exposed a crucial ‘catch’ in the process. As the viruses
leave the host cell, they become attached to a coating of (sialic) acid found on the
surface of the host cell. To leave the cell and infect neighbouring ones, viruses ﬁrst
require the work of a crucial enzyme called neuraminidase – which helps to dissolve
this ‘sticky’ acid and free the viruses.47 Metaphorically, one can think of neuramini-
dase as the ‘scissors’ that cut newly formed virus particles free from their host cell.
This neuraminidase enzyme is widely identiﬁed by the ‘N’ designation in the interna-
tional virus classiﬁcations frequently reported in the media (for example, H5N1,
H1N1, H7N9, etc.).
What would happen to inﬂuenza viruses in the absence of this enzyme? Without
the proper functioning of the neuraminidase, new virus particles would remain
‘stuck’ on the surface of the host cell with nowhere to go, and would therefore not
be able to circulate and penetrate other cells – as would be necessary for causing a
wider bodily infection. If there could be a way to selectively disrupt, or inhibit, the
workings of this crucial neuraminidase enzyme, it could thus mark an entry point
for a new type of antiviral medication. Tamiﬂu – and a closely related predecessor
drug named Relenza – are two attempts to intelligently and artiﬁcially design new
molecules that would do precisely that. Together they therefore form part of a new
class of antiviral therapies called neuraminidase inhibitors.
Yet the deliberate and rational design of such novel molecular therapies – princi-
pally by organic chemists – only became possible after Australian researchers had
ﬁrst decoded the molecular structure of neuraminidase. Three key developments
facilitated that crucial molecular decoding: (1) the deepening of knowledge about
the detailed molecular processes involved in virus replication; (2) the emergence of
new scientiﬁc technologies like x-ray crystallography capable of unravelling complex
molecular structures; and (3) advances in computer modelling and chemical pharma-
cology used for the rational design and synthesis of new molecules. Armed with these
new knowledges and technologies, scientists were eventually able to deliberately de-
sign an ‘artiﬁcial’ new molecule that could bind to a key site in the neuraminidase
enzyme, and that could carry out precisely this desired function of inhibiting the
enzyme’s key role in the process of viral replication. And so one of the world’s most
prominent medical countermeasures was born. More than any other medical counter-
measure, perhaps, the case of Tamiﬂu shows how the molecular vision of life is
not just inducing an array of new insecurities; it is also enabling the scientiﬁc devel-
opment of innovative pharmaceutical interventions designed at the level of the
molecular. As a necessary epistemic precondition for the technical and material
47 Reto Schneider, ‘Das Rennen um GS4104: Wie ein Medikament entwickelt, getestet und vermarktet
wird’, NZZ Folio: Die Zeitschrift der Neuen Zuercher Zeitung (April 2001), available at: {http://
www.nzzfolio.ch/www/d80bd71b-b264-4db4-afd0-277884b93470/showarticle/81bb3c96-9216-4eb5-
b602-7e0937369c79.aspx} accessed 1 March 2012.
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creation of such novel medical countermeasures, the molecular vision of life promul-
gated by the life sciences lies at the heart of the pharmaceuticalisation of security.
IV. Biocapital: Business interests and pharmaceutical companies
If molecular knowledge is a necessary precondition for the pharmaceutical turn in
security policy, it is not a sufﬁcient one. For the generation of such biomedical knowl-
edge, and its translation into new pharmaceutical treatments, is a capital-intensive
activity. Developing new medical countermeasures requires ﬁnancial investments
frequently running into the tens and even hundreds of millions of dollars. Under-
standing the ways in which capital coalesces around those new molecular knowledges
for the purposes of commercial exploitation is therefore another signiﬁcant driver of
the pharmaceuticalisation of security policy.
Kaushik Rajan points to the emergence of biocapital in the 1990s as ‘a particular
form of capitalism made speciﬁc because of emergent technologies and epistemologies
of the life sciences’.48 Such biocapital has been decisive for the development of new
medical countermeasures like Tamiﬂu in at least two ways. First, speculative venture
capital frequently plays a pivotal role in the early stages of drug discovery. The new
molecule that would eventually become Tamiﬂu was initially developed at Gilead
Sciences in the mid-1990s. Gilead has since risen to become one of the world’s most
successful biotechnology companies. At the time it was developing Tamiﬂu, however,
Gilead was still only a small start-up company in Silicon Valley, California. During
that time it was kept aﬂoat with millions of dollars in private venture capital. With-
out the willingness of venture capitalists to take considerable ﬁnancial risks on a new
biotechnology business that – at the time – was not yet operating at a proﬁt, and
which still had an unproven business model, Tamiﬂu is unlikely to have ever been
commercially developed. There is some evidence that the volume of such venture
biocapital has diminished signiﬁcantly in recent years, especially following the ﬁnan-
cial and banking crisis. Yet many of the medical countermeasures developed over the
past decade drew upon such venture capital during an early stage of their develop-
ment cycle.49
Once Gilead Sciences had completed the ‘upstream’ work of designing and syn-
thesising the new therapeutic molecule, it then licenced the compound to a more
established pharmaceutical company – Roche – in order to undertake the ‘down-
stream’ work of conducting clinical trials, obtaining regulatory approval, and mar-
keting the new product. Those are some of the most capital-intensive tasks in the
drug development cycle, and are easily beyond the reach of most start-up businesses.
For that reason the kind of licensing arrangement used for Tamiﬂu has since become
very common in the industry. Yet no sooner had the new therapeutic molecule
passed downstream into the hands of the multinational pharmaceutical industry, bio-
capital began to play an additional role – this time through the pursuit of corporate
commercial interests.
48 Kaushik Rajan, Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2006), p. 78; see also Melinda Cooper, Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal
Era (Seattle, WA: Washington University Press, 2008).
49 Tamas Bartfai and Graham Lees, The Future of Drug Discovery: Who Decides Which Diseases to Treat
(London: Elsevier, 2013), p. 275.
The pharmaceuticalisation of security 931
Investigative journalists have exposed how – in the case of neuraminidase in-
hibitors for inﬂuenza – pharmaceutical companies like Roche were able to rapidly
raise awareness about their new drugs amongst international health organisations –
even before the companies had secured regulatory approval.50 That was achieved by
working closely with scientists, who are often also invited by international health
organisations to share their expertise. For example, in 1999 – the same year in which
Roche was seeking regulatory approval for Tamiﬂu in the United States – the World
Health Organization began to raise concern about pandemic inﬂuenza and drafted
a document entitled Inﬂuenza Pandemic Plan: The Role of WHO and Guidelines
for National and Regional Planning.51 The controversial document, which bears the
WHO logo and has been repeatedly cited by the industry, warns of serious con-
sequences of a pandemic and highlights the importance of antiviral medications. Re-
ferring mostly to the older generation of antivirals – amantadine and rimantadine –
the report also pointed to the development of two new compounds – zanamivir and
oseltamivir – that would subsequently become marketed as Relenza and Tamiﬂu
respectively. The report noted: ‘if approved, and found to have a good safety proﬁle,
either drug would offer the advantage, during inter-pandemic situations, of being
useful regardless of the virus type’.52
A subsequent investigation published in BMJ (formerly the British Medical Journal)
further revealed that the document was compiled by WHO in collaboration with the
European Scientiﬁc Working Group on Inﬂuenza (ESWI) – which was industry-
funded by Roche and other inﬂuenza drug manufacturers.53 The BMJ investigation
also exposed that several of the experts present at this meeting had earlier been
participating in Roche-sponsored events.54 Such episodes show that one of the ways
that commercial backers of innovative molecular therapies may seek to maximise the
return on their investment is by seeking to inﬂuence governments to procure sizeable
quantities of their new products in the name of strengthening health security.55 The
ways in which new molecular knowledges attract and coalesce with – politically
inﬂuential – biocapital is thus another crucial driver behind the pharmaceutical turn
in security policy.
V. Therapeutic citizens: Changing patient behaviour and the Internet
Once new molecular therapies are commercially developed, governments can also
come under intense political pressures from ‘below’ to procure the latest medical
countermeasures on behalf of their citizens. The social anthropologist Vinh-Kim
Nguyen has worked with the concept of ‘therapeutic citizenship’ to capture the mul-
tiple ways in which biomedical knowledge is shaping the government of both human
50 Deborah Cohen and Philip Carter, ‘Conﬂicts of interest: WHO and the pandemic ﬂu ‘‘conspiracies’’ ’,
BMJ, 340 (2010), pp. 1274–9.
51 World Health Organization, ‘Inﬂuenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan. The Role of WHO and Guidelines
for National or Regional Planning’ (Geneva: World Health Organization, April 1999), p. 54.
52 Ibid., p. 54.
53 Cohen and Carter, ‘Conﬂicts of interest’, p. 1275.
54 Ibid.
55 On the role of pharmaceutical companies in global health governance more generally, see Anne
Roemer-Mahler, ‘The rise of companies from emerging markets in global health governance: Opportu-
nities and challenges’, this Special Issue.
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(and nonhuman) affairs.56 He has traced how such knowledge is giving rise to com-
plex new forms of association, activism, and exchange, which he was witnessing
around access to antiretroviral therapy for people living with HIV/AIDS. Although
Nguyen’s notion of therapeutic citizenship is wide-ranging and complex, it is also un-
derpinned by a strong expectation by citizens and patients that they should have
rapid and affordable access to the latest pharmaceutical treatments.
Even beyond the contested politics of HIV/AIDS,57 there are signs that citizens
are becoming much more proactive in seeking out the latest pharmaceutical regimens
– often facilitated by recourse to the Internet.58 In the case of Tamiﬂu, direct-to-con-
sumer advertising of the drug was not permitted in Europe due to legal constraints,
but extensive media coverage of the pandemic threat certainly made citizens aware of
the existence of this new drug. Bolstered by this awareness, citizens could actively
seek out the information about this therapy on their own accord. The extent to which
citizens were trying to obtain information about Tamiﬂu, and perhaps even trying to
acquire the drug over the Internet, can be gleaned through looking at Google Trends
data. Google Trends analyses a sample of searches performed on the commercial
search engine, and then computes how many searches are being performed for a
particular term relative to the number of searches done over time. These results are
56 Vinh-Kim Nguyen, The Republic of Therapy: Triage and Sovereignty in West Africa’s Time of AIDS
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); see also Adriana Petryna, Biological Citizenship: The
Science and Politics of Chernobyl-Exposed Populations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2013).
57 See Garrett W. Brown, ‘Norm diffusion and health system strengthening: The persistent relevance of
national leadership in global health governance’, this Special Issue.
58 Peter Conad, The Medicalization of Society: On the Transformation of Human Conditions into Treatable






























































































































































































































Graph 1. Internet activity surrounding Tamiﬂu during recent pandemic scares
Source: Google Trends 2013.
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displayed in the Search Volume Index. Although this only provides a rough approx-
imation due to the use of data sampling methods and multiple approximations, it
clearly shows the enormously increased Internet activity surrounding Tamiﬂu during
recent pandemic scares. In the graph below, the number 100 represents the peak
search interest.
The Search Volume Index for ‘Tamiﬂu’ indicates two distinct spikes: one during
the international fears of an imminent H5N1 pandemic in 2005, and one during the
H1N1 pandemic that begun to spread in the April of 2009. Those peaks coincide
with periods of intense media reporting.59
Such data suggest that many citizens desire information about, and actively seek
access to, pharmaceutical treatments – especially during an emergency. There is also
further evidence that if governments do not proactively provide access to such phar-
maceutical therapies, citizens will go to considerable lengths to access them by other
means. During the H5N1 ‘bird’ ﬂu pandemic scare, for example, the poplar internet
auction site ‘EBay’ had to withdraw sales of Tamiﬂu through its website after prices
reached more than £100 for a treatment course – more than three times its usual pre-
scription price.60 During the subsequent H1N1 ‘swine’ ﬂu pandemic in April 2009,
and despite UK government reassurances that the national stockpile was sufﬁciently
large, online pharmacists again reported very dramatic increases in demand for
Tamiﬂu as people tried to create personal stockpiles, in some cases demand was
reportedly up by around 1,000 per cent.61 Faced with imminent health security
threats, many citizens will actively seek information about, and demand access to,
available pharmaceutical defences.
Those citizen expectations that they should enjoy access to the latest treatments
also create tacit political pressure for governments – especially popularly elected
ones – to make such pharmaceuticals more widely available. Explaining some of
the thinking behind the UK decision to create an antiviral stockpile, Professor
Robert Dingwall, who was a member of the UK Committee on Ethical Aspects of
Pandemic Inﬂuenza, explained that: ‘It was felt it’d simply be unacceptable to the
UK population to tell them we had a huge stockpile of drugs but they were not going
to be made available.’62 The decision also reportedly came against a background a
feelings amongst ofﬁcials that ‘a fear of inaction and unpreparedness by the Depart-
ment of Health which would lead to cataclysmic disapproval in the media’.63 The
ways in which notions of citizenship are evolving around access to pharmaceutical
treatments, in conjunction with popular expectations about state provision of phar-
maceutical defences in the event of an emergency, are thus further drivers of the
pharmaceutical turn in the security policy. When it comes to medical countermeas-
ures, governments can ﬁnd themselves being effectively ‘squeezed’ from both sides –
59 Google Trends. Search performed on ‘Tamiﬂu’, available at: {http://www.google.co.uk/trends/explore?
q=Tamiﬂu#q=Tamiﬂu&cmpt=q} accessed 2 September 2013.
60 Reuters, ‘EBay stops Tamiﬂu sale on Web as drug price soars’, Reuters (18 October 2005), available at:
{http://www.redorbit.com/news/health/275417/ebay_stops_tamiﬂu_sale_on_web_as_drug_price_soars/
index.html} accessed 13 July 2010.
61 Jon Swaine and Rebecca Smith, ‘Swine ﬂu: Online pharmacies report huge surge in demand for Tamiﬂu’,
The Telegraph (27 April 2009), available at: {http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/swine-ﬂu/5231337/
Swine-ﬂu-Online-pharmacies-report-huge-surge-in-demand-for-Tamiﬂu.html} accessed 8 July 2010.
62 Simon Garﬁeld, ‘Catch it! Bin it! Proﬁt from it!’, The Observer (25 October 2009), available at: {http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/25/swine-ﬂu-vaccines-proﬁt/print} accessed 2 September 2013.
63 Ibid.
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not just by commercial pressures, but also by rising popular expectations to ensure
widespread access to the latest pharmaceutical treatments.
VI. Flexible pharmaceutical regulation: Governments and the bioeconomy
Caught in the crosshairs of those combined commercial and political pressures, govern-
ments are also adapting their regulatory regimes to make innovative pharmaceuticals
more readily accessible. Those processes of regulatory adaptation mark a ﬁnal piece
of the pharmaceuticalisation ‘puzzle’ because pharmaceutical products are histori-
cally some of the most highly regulated products in the world. In most high-income
countries any new pharmaceutical product needs to obtain ofﬁcial regulatory ap-
proval before it can be prescribed. This is true even if the government administers
it. The extensive pharmaceutical turn in security policy witnessed over the past de-
cade could not, therefore, have unfolded without a signiﬁcant degree of regulatory
adaptation by governments.
Again the case of Tamiﬂu is instructive. In the United States, the process of
obtaining regulatory approval for Tamiﬂu coincided with a period of profound
change in the regulatory approach taken by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). In the late 1990s, and in a social context where many people were dying
from AIDS-related illnesses, both patient groups and companies pressured the FDA
to speed up and ease approval processes for new antiviral therapies. Tamiﬂu was not
the ﬁrst neuraminidase inhibitor to come up before the FDA for approval. That dis-
tinction went to its closely related predecessor drug Relenza, which FDA handled
through a new priority review process lasting only six months.
During this Relenza approval process the Harvard-trained FDA statistician –
Mike Elashoff – raised signiﬁcant concerns about whether the efﬁcacy of the drug
had been established by the clinical trial data. Weighing up the evidence and discus-
sion, the advisory committee overwhelmingly sided with the FDA statistician, and
decided not to recommend approval of the drug by a signiﬁcant majority of 13 votes
to 4.64 That indicated a low chance of approval for the new drug, much to the dis-
may of its commercial developer. Months later, however, senior management at
FDA nevertheless granted Relenza marketing approval, in part citing concerns about
a possible future pandemic. In an extensive interview conducted for this research
project, the same statistician – who had initially also been tasked with statistically
evaluating the data on the other neuraminidase inhibitor Tamiﬂu – revealed that
he was subsequently removed from the Tamiﬂu brief, which was then passed on to
another statistician.65 When Tamiﬂu come up for regulatory approval a few months
later, it was then approved by the FDA without recourse to an advisory committee –
in part justiﬁed on the basis that the precedent for a neuraminidase inhibitor had
already been established by the approval of Relenza.66
In the years that followed, governments also went on to systematically introduce
an array of more ﬂexible regulatory processes speciﬁcally governing the approval of
64 FDA, ‘Food and Drug Administration Centre for Drug Evaluation and Research: Antiviral Drugs
Advisory Committee’ (Gaithersburg, MA: 24 February 1999).
65 Mike Elashoff, Interview, San Francisco, 31 March 2012.
66 Ibid.
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medical countermeasures.67 Those novel pathways mean that, in the United States,
some medical countermeasures can now be approved on the basis of animal efﬁcacy
studies rather than human clinical trials – thus easing the threshold for regulatory
approval. New procedures were also introduced authorising the US government –
in an emergency situation – to use a drug that had not yet secured regulatory ap-
proval, or the use of the drug for purposes other than those for which it was initially
licenced.
In Europe, furthermore, the European Medicines Agency initiated three separate
procedures for speeding up the availability of inﬂuenza vaccines during a pandemic.
Those include: (1) a ‘mock-up procedure’ whereby a vaccine can be authorised in ad-
vance of a pandemic on the basis of a strain that could potentially cause a pandemic;
(2) an ‘emergency procedure’, which reduces the authorisation procedure from 210 to
seventy days; and (3) a ‘modiﬁcation’ procedure whereby a ‘seasonal’ ﬂu vaccine
might be altered to afford protection against a pandemic strain.68 Without such
enhanced regulatory ﬂexibility, it would be more difﬁcult for many medical counter-
measures to gain the necessary regulatory approval, and companies would face
greater disincentives for investing in the costly development of novel medical counter-
measures. The willingness of governments to make their regulatory approaches for
approving medical countermeasures more ﬂexible is thus a crucial, ﬁnal factor in
‘unlocking’ the pharmaceutical turn in security policy.
Conclusion
Pharmaceuticals have become a much more prominent feature in the twenty-ﬁrst-
century landscape of security policy. Governments with the requisite resources now
actively incentivise the commercial development of new medical countermeasures –
through the design of novel programmes, through the use of public funds, through
the creation of new institutions, and through the introduction of greater regulatory
ﬂexibilities. Governments are also building extensive pharmaceutical stockpiles that
require continuous maintenance and replenishment, and are even standing up elabo-
rate new logistical systems for distributing those medical countermeasures en masse
to their populations outside of clinical settings. Indicators abound, then, that phar-
maceuticals are becoming more vital to the task of securing populations.
At the core of that pharmaceutical turn in security policy lies the rise of a molec-
ular vision of life promulgated by the biomedical sciences. Reimagining life as the
complex interplay of molecular processes is provoking profound new fears about
our collective vulnerability to underlying microbiological processes – be it in the
form of pandemics or bioterrorism – that are ﬁnding their contemporary political
expression in the rise of global health security concerns. At the same time, and as
the detailed examination of Tamiﬂu showed, this molecular vision of life is simulta-
neously engendering new strategies for intervening upon life processes – principally
by enabling the scientiﬁc development of an array of new medical countermeasures
67 Stefan Elbe,‘Medical countermeasures for national security: A new government role in the pharmaceu-
ticalization of society’, Social Science & Medicine (forthcoming, 2014).
68 European Medicines Agency (EMA), ‘Authorization Procedures’ (London: European Medicines Agency,
2014), available at: {http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/q_and_a/
q_and_a_detail_000080.jsp} accessed 6 March 2014.
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designed at the level of the molecular. How we understand life does not just shape
what makes us feel insecure, but also inﬂuences how we in turn seek to secure life.
That it should be possible for security policy to undergo such a process of phar-
maceuticalisation reafﬁrms the essentially malleable and socially constructed view of
security as a complex ﬁeld with boundaries that are subject to constant social re-
negotiation and contestation.69 That can be seen most evidently in the way that
health security considerations have already begun to expand the borders of the security
concept by incorporating many pressing health-based threats. It can further be
seen in the increased role that medical experts now play in the formulation and
implementation of security policy. And it can be seen by the increased recourse to
pharmaceutically-based security strategies.70 Here the rise of global health security
and its attendant quest for medical countermeasures forms part of a complex political
negotiation – sometimes explicit, yet frequently implicit – of where the boundaries of
security policy lie in an age of emergent molecular vulnerabilities.
But the pharmaceuticalisation perspective also contributes more to security studies
than this core insight alone. Pharmaceuticalisation theory further captures the subtle
ways in which our contemporary understandings, practices, and boundaries of security
policy are – to no small measure – shaped by the broader social forces of health and
biomedicine. Put differently, approaching global health security from the perspective
of pharmaceuticals reveals that how we understand and practice security today cannot
be divorced form our underlying and evolving conceptions of life, health and medicine.
That ultimately also tells us something deeper about the contours of contem-
porary world politics. At a level of considerable simpliﬁcation and generalisation,
we could say that – as a discipline – International Relations has long sought to
explain the workings of international politics through recourse to the conceptual
frameworks of politics, economics, or law – whether it is the structuring role of
anarchy, of capitalism, of norms, or indeed the interaction of them all. Although
that can hardly be considered an exhaustive list, one is certainly hard pressed to
ﬁnd scholarly accounts of international politics that afford health and medicine a
prominent – not to mention constitutive – role. Even where the importance of health
issues has occasionally been acknowledged in the scholarship of international politics,
the discipline has tended to view them as second-order matters of ‘low’ politics when
compared to the ‘high’ politics of international security.
The analysis of the pharmaceuticalisation of security presented here suggests
something quite different. It shows that the social forces of health and biomedicine
are much more formidable than this received disciplinary picture would suggest.
That can be seen in terms of how infectious disease threats – from HIV/AIDS and
SARS through to bird (H5N1) ﬂu, swine ﬂu (H1N1), and Ebola – now routinely
attract the highest levels of international diplomatic efforts. It can also be seen in
the way that international institutions – like the World Health Organization – are
emerging as conduits of these social forces by pushing for wider access to pharma-
ceutical treatments, by recommending pharmaceutical strategies to member states,
and by coordinating the international creation of new pharmaceutical stockpiles.
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And it can be seen in the ways that biomedicine is beginning to inﬂuence how states
understand security, how they practice it, and indeed what it means for citizens to
feel insecure. Far from merely being matters of ‘low’ politics, the social forces of
health and biomedicine are powerful enough to inﬂuence the core practices of inter-
national politics – even those of security. For a discipline long accustomed to study-
ing macrolevel processes and systemic structures, international relations are – in the
end – also engendered and constituted by our knowledge of the minute morass of
molecules.
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